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 Abstract 
Many patients undergo diagnostic tests which are normal. In this essay, we consider 
how clinicians can provide acceptable explanations for symptoms which persist after 
ruling out known physical disease. We begin by examining explanations from the 
perspectives of patients and clinicians and consider the different ways of explaining 
symptoms following negative tests. We then propose the characteristics of an ideal, 
or rational, explanation. This rational explanation is a pragmatic approach which, 
while imperfect, makes sense to both doctor and patient and promotes appropriate 
action. 
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Introduction 
Many patients undergo diagnostic tests which are normal. However, sustained 
reassurance does not automatically follow from negative diagnostic tests (1), and 
patients who continue to consult with “medically unexplained” symptoms (MUS) are 
likely to receive further, possibly unnecessary tests, and treatments from their 
doctors (2).  
In this essay, we argue that clinicians can provide acceptable explanations for 
symptoms which persist after ruling out known physical disease and that this is a 
necessary counterweight to the power of diagnostic testing.  We will examine 
explanations from the perspectives of patients and clinicians and consider the 
different ways of explaining symptoms following negative tests. Building on earlier 
research (3), we will propose the characteristics of an ideal, or rational, explanation. 
We will take a pragmatic view that the rational explanation, while imperfect, makes 
sense to both doctor and patient and promotes appropriate action. 
Reassurance and explanations 
There is a strong link between explanations and reassurance. Reassurance, for 
instance after negative diagnostic tests, has two components: emotional and 
cognitive(4). The emotional component of reassurance (relief) is immediate. It is the 
response we witness to statements like “Your tests are negative, you don’t have 
cancer”. However while relief feels good, it is only transient for many people, 
particularly if symptoms persist. If it occurs repeatedly, it may even lead to a cycle of 
anxiety and relief-seeking. In contrast, the cognitive component of reassurance 
(assurance) is longer lasting, and has sustained benefit (5). It accompanies the 
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recognition that even if symptoms persist, they are not a sign of danger and may be 
controlled. For at least some patients it means answering the question “So if my 
tests are negative, what is causing my symptoms?” 
As MUS are common, one might expect doctors to be skilled and confident in 
explaining them to patients. However patients commonly report otherwise (6) and 
observation indicates that despite giving patients ample opportunity to talk about 
their “medically unexplained” symptoms, general practitioners do not structure these 
consultations well and spend little time trying to explain to patients what is happening 
to them (7). Even experienced GPs have a very limited repertoire of explanatory 
models and scripts (8).  
 Patients and explanation 
There are several different approaches to the way patients make sense of 
symptoms. Probably the most widely used model of illness appraisal is the common-
sense model of illness (9). It contains five categories of illness representation: 
identity, cause, timeline, consequences and controllability and suggests that these 
representations are processed both cognitively and emotionally. It implies that 
patients seek to identify the name of the condition that causes the symptom, its 
cause, course and consequences and how to control it. In the case of MUS, all the 
components of illness representation may be contested between doctor and patient, 
in a clash of professional expertise against personal experience(6). 
Patients’ own explanations and interpretations of symptoms are often sophisticated 
and complex (3). While most medical explanations invoke physical changes, such as 
damage, inflammation or wear, many lay explanations are more subtle and dynamic, 
with ideas of imbalance or disordered function (10). Importantly, patients’ 
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explanations for symptoms often include elements of stress or emotional distress but 
usually as one factor among many (11). 
Clinicians and explanation 
When faced with physical symptoms and tests which are normal, or which are 
ambiguous (such as the finding of age-appropriate degenerative change on X-ray), 
clinicians can choose from a range of explanatory strategies. We consider these 
within four categories of explanation: normalising, biomedical, psychosomatic and 
biopsychosocial explanations; we also consider the idea of non-explanation which is 
often associated with the idea of needing to accept uncertainty. 
Normalisation 
Normalising explanations convey the message that the patient’s symptoms are 
within the broad scope of normal experience. They assert that there is nothing 
seriously wrong, either by indicating the absence of apparent disease or through 
non-specific explanations such as “probably a virus”, “wear and tear”, or “doing too 
much”. They draw on the doctor’s authority in differentiating disease from normal 
experience and may emphasise normal test results, despite the fact that 
reassurance following negative investigation is rarely sustained (1) . 
A series of studies of clinical communication about persistent MUS in UK general 
practice reported three kinds of normalisation from the patient’s perspective: 
dismissal (in which symptoms are played down even though they are persistent), 
inappropriate explanation (in which explanation is given but fails to engage with the 
patient’s concerns) and constructive engagement (in which the explanation of 
symptoms is plausible, blame free and facilitates therapeutic partnership)(12). These 
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features of the constructive engagement form of normalisation are valued by patients 
and will be used later as a component of the rational explanation. 
Biomedical 
In conditions with clearly understood pathophysiology, doctors may explain 
conditions both in terms of diagnostic entities (“your chest pains are due to 
angina..”), and in terms of pathophysiological process (“… which happens when an 
artery supplying blood to the heart muscle is narrowed and not enough blood can get 
through”). This approach becomes more difficult to justify when the findings on 
investigation are poorly correlated with symptoms (for instance MRI disc lesions and 
back pain), although many clinicians continue to describe these minor or incidental 
pathological findings as if they are the root cause of symptoms. 
With regard to MUS, there is increasing recognition that a range of physiological 
mechanisms may be implicated in symptoms. These include alterations in autonomic 
function, endocrine regulation, immunity and the group of neurophysiological 
processes termed central sensitisation. They may lead to changes in, or altered 
perceptions of, processes such as gastrointestinal motility, balance, musculoskeletal 
activity or pain. None of these has yet been found to be a sufficiently strong 
explanation to be the sole pathophysiological mechanism for any of the MUS 
syndromes, however they are likely to play a role, to varying degrees, in many 
patients and may be useful as components of constructive explanations. 
Psychosomatic  
Psychosomatic explanations, and the related concept of somatisation, imply that the 
root cause of MUS is some form of unresolved or unexpressed mental distress. 
Simple explanations of this type include suggesting stress as a cause of tension type 
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headache. More complex explanatory models may seek to reframe physical 
symptoms by making a link between mental problems and physical symptoms, for 
instance in the timing or severity of symptoms. This was most clearly formalised in 
the approach known as reattribution, which despite its widespread use, may have 
little benefit when used within conventional brief consultations (13).    
Psychosomatic explanations are often unhelpful. Patients frequently perceive them 
as threatening and resist them. Even when patients consider that stress might play a 
part in their symptoms, they want to be sure the doctor is not jumping to conclusions 
and they worry that conceding psychosomatic cause for one problem may set a 
precedent for future symptoms (14). Patients wish to control when and how clinical 
communication includes their emotional world (15) and deploy a range of discursive 
tactics in order to preserve their identity as a legitimate patient (16). Patient’s 
resistance to including psychological components in explanations may be reduced 
when doctors propose a physiological mechanism for symptoms (hormone changes 
or sustained autonomic arousal) as a process which can also be influenced by stress 
(17).  
Biopsychosocial  
More sophisticated biopsychosocial explanations involve a range of interacting 
components(18) . These may include the autonomic, endocrine and immunological 
mechanisms described earlier, combined with psychological processes such as 
somatosensory amplification, catastrophisation and symptom focus. These 
biopsychosocial models avoid a simple psychosomatic causal pathway and underpin 
Cognitive Behavioural Therapy which has been shown to be effective for patients 
with persistent MUS (19), as well as for explained symptoms such as fatigue in 
neurological diseases. Such models often seek to identify and separately address 
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components which act within different timescales, for instance a transient physical 
illness may set up a state of sustained autonomic arousal which is perpetuated by 
cognitive or behavioural factors.  
MUS are associated with substantial psychological co-morbidity: anxiety and 
depressive disorders are both common in patients who have had even a small 
number of referrals for MUS and it is important that doctors are sensitive to this. 
Biopsychosocial models allow anxiety and depression to be included in the 
explanation, sometimes as a consequence rather than a cause, especially when the 
patient volunteers pointers to them. 
Non – explanation, accepting uncertainty 
The fact that we cannot be certain (and sometimes simply do not know) why 
symptoms are present means there is an argument for simply telling patients this. 
Some doctors prefer this approach with patients: for example in the statement “Your 
test is negative, there is no sign of serious disease; I see many people with 
symptoms like this which I cannot explain”. Some doctors will go further, suggesting 
that the patient should accept that some things, including an explanation of their 
symptoms, are unknowable. While the simplicity of this approach is attractive, it 
ignores the fact that there is much we do not know about many “explained” 
conditions (for instance migraine) which doctors are otherwise happy to explain. 
More importantly, it fails to engage with the patient’s own sense-making frameworks 
or needs.    
Working together to explain 
We take the view that doctors have a responsibility to assist patients in making 
sense of symptoms. In the absence of a positive diagnostic test, over which both 
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doctor and patient can agree, there is a need for explanation which makes sense to 
both parties. This involves bringing together both the patient’s account and the 
doctor’s inevitably incomplete medical knowledge to suggest an explanation which is 
acceptable to both (3). This creative mixing of the patient’s lived experience with a 
biologically plausible account is a form of personal doctoring which exemplifies what 
Schei has called “clinical leadership” (20). 
Towards the rational explanation  
The ideal, or rational, explanation must therefore reflect both clinician and patient 
factors. It should make sense to both patient and doctor, which means being 
compatible with current medical knowledge. While it may be incomplete (for instance 
it may focus on symptom-generating mechanisms rather than root causes) it should 
be practically useful in terms of guiding treatment or adaptation. It is thus rational in 
offering plausible mechanisms by which symptoms may arise, and rational in its 
purpose of helping the patient make sense of their experience and promoting 
therapeutic action and partnership.  
While the evidence we have presented is limited, and there is a need for more 
research into effective explanations for MUS, we propose six criteria for the rational 
explanation.  These are based on the constructive normalisation type of explanation, 
the common sense model and the principle of personal relevance. 1) it is plausible 
(to both doctor and patient; 2) it does not imply weakness or fault on the part of the 
patient; 3) it promotes therapeutic partnership or action; 4) it applies a descriptive 
label (which need not be a specific diagnosis); 5) it addresses causation, although 
this may be through perpetuating mechanisms rather than root cause; 6) it is created 
through dialogue between doctor and patient. Figure 1 contains two examples of 
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rational explanation – the brief format means neither is presented as arising through 
dialogue, though ideally both would be.  
Conclusion 
Doctors need to become more skilled in suggesting explanations for persistent 
symptoms after negative diagnostic tests. Our proposed rational explanation can be 
used as a guide, with which doctors can help their patients find meaningful 
explanations.  
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